I am a professional philosopher, specialising in epistemology and the philosophies of language and mathematics. I am currently Global Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at New York University as well as Professor of Philosophical Research at the University of Stirling. Previously I have taught at Oxford, Columbia, Michigan, Princeton, St. Andrews, where I was the first Wardlaw University Professor and founded the research center, Arché, and Aberdeen where I held the Regius Chair of Logic and directed the Northern Institute of Philosophy.
My books include Wittgenstein on the Foundations of Mathematics (Harvard 1980); Frege’s Conception of Numbers as Objects (Humanities Press 1983); Truth and Objectivity (Harvard 1992); Realism Meaning and Truth (Blackwell 1986, 2nd editon 1992); The Reason’s Proper Study (with Bob Hale, Oxford 2001), Rails to Infinity (Harvard 2001), and Saving the Differences (Harvard 2003).
Prize Fellowship, All Souls College Oxford
British Academy Research Readership
University of St Andrews
Two-year full time research grant.
Leverhulme Trust Personal Research Professorship
A five-year full-time research grant
Honorary D. Litt. Aberdeen
Elected Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences
Elected Fellow of the British Academy
Elected Fellow of the Royal Society of Edinburgh
Elected Member of the Academia Europaea
Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics, Frege, General Epistemology, the Later Wittgenstein, Self-knowledge
Article
Kripke, Quine, the 'Adoption Problem' and the Empirical Conception of Logic
Boghossian P & Wright C (2024) Kripke, Quine, the 'Adoption Problem' and the Empirical Conception of Logic. Mind, 133 (529), pp. 86-116. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzad011
Article
Wright C (2024) Science Denial, Cognitive Command and the Theory-Ladenness of Observation: A Postscript for a Time of ‘Post-Truth’. International Journal of Philosophical Studies. https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2024.2302522
Book Chapter
Williamsonian Skepcticism About The A Priori
Melis G & Wright C (2023) Williamsonian Skepcticism About The A Priori. In: Dodd D & Zardini E (eds.) Beyond Sense? New Essays on the Significance, Grounds, and Extent of the A Priori. Oxford: Oxford Univeristy Press.
Article
Epistemic entitlement, epistemic risk and leaching
Moretti L & Wright C (2022) Epistemic entitlement, epistemic risk and leaching. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12874
Article
Deflating inflationism? Reflections on Douglas Edwards' The Metaphysics of Truth
Wright C (2022) Deflating inflationism? Reflections on Douglas Edwards' The Metaphysics of Truth. Inquiry. https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2022.2049528
Article
Alethic pluralism, deflationism, and faultless disagreement
Wright C (2021) Alethic pluralism, deflationism, and faultless disagreement. Metaphilosophy, 52 (3-4), pp. 432- 448. https://doi.org/10.1111/meta.12491
Authored Book
The Riddle of Vagueness: Selected Essays 1975-2020
Wright C (2021) The Riddle of Vagueness: Selected Essays 1975-2020. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-riddle-of-vagueness-9780199277339?cc=us&lang=en&#
Article
Taking Stock: Hale, Heck, and Wright on Neo-Logicism and Higher-Order Logic
Wright C (2021) Taking Stock: Hale, Heck, and Wright on Neo-Logicism and Higher-Order Logic. Philosophia Mathematica, 29 (3), pp. 392-416. https://doi.org/10.1093/philmat/nkab017
Article
Relativism and the Metaphysics of Value: A Comment on Daan Evers
Wright C (2021) Relativism and the Metaphysics of Value: A Comment on Daan Evers. British Journal of Aesthetics, 61 (1), pp. 87-104. https://doi.org/10.1093/aesthj/ayaa020
Book Chapter
Wright C (2020) Replies [Logic, Language ad Mathematics]. In: Logic, Language and Mathematics: Themes from the Philosophy of Crispin Wright. Ist. ed. n/a, n/a. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 277-432.
Article
Eyes directed outward: Alex Byrne: Transparency and Self-Knowledge
Conlan P, Merlo G & Wright C (2020) Eyes directed outward: Alex Byrne: Transparency and Self-Knowledge. Journal of Philosophy, 117 (6), pp. 332-351. https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil2020117620
Policy Document
Active mile briefing: evidence and policy summary
Chalkley A, Clark J, Gahagan A, Aitkin L, Booth J, Brannan M, Crane C, Daly-Smith A, Griffin I, Holmes I, Moran C, Nasir N, Poole R, Ryde G, Sherar L, Sollars L, Williams L & Wright C (2020) Active mile briefing: evidence and policy summary. Chalkley A (), Clark J () & Gahagan A () Public Health England. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/active-mile-briefings
Book Chapter
"How did the serpent of inconsistency enter Frege's paradise?"
Wright C (2019) "How did the serpent of inconsistency enter Frege's paradise?". In: Ebert PA & Rossberg M (eds.) Essays on Frege's Basic Laws of Arithmetic. Oxford UK: Oxford University Press, pp. 411-436. https://global.oup.com/academic/product/essays-on-freges-basic-laws-of-arithmetic-9780198712084?prevNumResPerPage=60&lang=en&cc=gb#
Book Chapter
Wright C (2019) Intuitionism and the Sorites. In: Zardini E & Oms S (eds.) The Sorites Paradox. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Book Chapter
Oxonian Scepticism about the A Priori
Wright C (2019) Oxonian Scepticism about the A Priori. In: Beyond Sense? New Essays on the Significance, Grounds, and Extent of the A Priori. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Article
Wright C (2018) Logical Non-Cognitivism. Philosophical Issues, 28 (1), pp. 425-450. https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12132
Book Chapter
Wright C (2018) Counter-Conceivability Again. In: Fred-Rivera I & Leech J (eds.) Being Necessary: Themes of Ontology and Modality from the Work of Bob Hale. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 266 - 282.
Edited Book
A companion to the philosophy of language
Miller A, Wright C & Hale B (eds.) (2017) A companion to the philosophy of language, 2nd ed. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy, 10. Chichester: Wiley Blackwell. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118972090
Book Chapter
Abstraction and Epistemic Entitlement: On the Epistemological Status of Hume's Principle
Wright C (2017) Abstraction and Epistemic Entitlement: On the Epistemological Status of Hume's Principle. In: Ebert P & Rossberg M (eds.) Abstractionism: Essays in Philosophy of Mathematics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 161-185. https://global.oup.com/academic/product/abstractionism-9780199645268?q=ebert〈=en&cc=gb
Article
Ferrari F & Wright C (2017) Talking with Vultures. Mind, 126 (503), pp. 911-936. https://academic.oup.com/mind/article/3003290; https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzw066
Book Chapter
The Variability of ‘Knows': An Opinionated Overview
Wright C (2017) The Variability of ‘Knows': An Opinionated Overview. In: Jenkins Ichikawa J (ed.) The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism. Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 13 - 31.
Book Chapter
On the Characterization of Borderline Cases
Wright C (2016) On the Characterization of Borderline Cases. In: Ostertag G (ed.) Meanings and Other Things: Themes from the Work of Stephen Schiffer. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 190-210. https://global.oup.com/academic/product/meanings-and-other-things-9780199684939?q=Meanings%20and%20Other%20Things〈=en&cc=gb#
Article
Assessment-Sensitivity: the Manifestation Challenge
Wright C (2016) Assessment-Sensitivity: the Manifestation Challenge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 92 (1), pp. 189-196. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12262
Article
Bolzano's Definition of Analytic Propositions
Hale B & Wright C (2015) Bolzano's Definition of Analytic Propositions. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 91 (1), pp. 325-364. http://www.brill.com/products/book/themes-ontology-mind-and-logic#TOC_1
Book Chapter
Self-knowledge: the Reality of Privileged Access
Wright C (2015) Self-knowledge: the Reality of Privileged Access. In: Goldberg S (ed.) Externalism, Self-Knowledge and Scepticism: New Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 49-74. http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/philosophy/philosophy-mind-and-language/externalism-self-knowledge-and-skepticism-new-essays
Book Chapter
On Epistemic Entitlement (II): Welfare State Epistemology
Wright C (2014) On Epistemic Entitlement (II): Welfare State Epistemology. In: Dodd D & Zardini E (eds.) Scepticism and Perceptual Justification. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 213-247. https://global.oup.com/academic/product/scepticism-and-perceptual-justification-9780199658343?cc=gb〈=en&