Deflating inflationism? Reflections on Douglas Edwards' The Metaphysics of Truth

Citation

Wright C (2022) Deflating inflationism? Reflections on Douglas Edwards' The Metaphysics of Truth. Inquiry. https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2022.2049528

Abstract
I assess Edwards' two principal arguments against Deflationary conceptions of Truth and argue that neither is fully successful, then revisit the ‘Inflationary’ argument of chapter 1 of Truth and Objectivity. A case is outlined for a more variegated account of the opposition between realist and anti-realist views of different regions of thought than Edwards' account permits.

Keywords
Alethic pluralism; deflationism; realism; objectivity; sparse and abundant properties

Notes
Output Status: Forthcoming/Available Online

Journal
Inquiry

• Published version