Moral and Criminal Responsibility: Answering and Refusing to Answer

Citation

Duff RA (2019) Moral and Criminal Responsibility: Answering and Refusing to Answer. In: Coates DJ & Tognazzini NA (eds.) Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, vol. 5: Themes from the Philosophy of Gary Watson. Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 165-190. https://global.oup.com/academic/product/oxford-studies-in-agency-and-responsibility-volume-5-9780198830238?lang=en&cc=gb

Abstract
First paragraph: Criminal lawyers and criminal-law theorists, as well as philosophers, have much to learn from Gary Watson’s seminal work on responsibility. In this chapter, by way of appropriately critical tribute to his contributions, and in the hope that this will provoke him to explore further some of the issues I discuss, I focus on what he has said about responsibility as accountability (as distinct from responsibility as attributability), and on some of its implications for the criminal law (see especially Watson 2004a, 2004b).