Contract Renegotiation and Rent Re-distribution: Who Gets Raked Over the Coals?

Citation

Kosnik L & Lange I (2011) Contract Renegotiation and Rent Re-distribution: Who Gets Raked Over the Coals?. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 62 (2), pp. 155-165. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2011.03.006

Abstract
Policy shocks affect the rent distribution in long-term contracts, which can lead to such contracts being renegotiated. We seek an understanding of what aspects of contract design, in the face of a substantial policy shock, affect the propensity to renegotiate. We test our hypotheses using data on U.S. coal contracts after the policy shock of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. Contracts are divided into two categories, those that were renegotiated following the shock and those that were not. Characteristics of the contract are used to explain whether or not the contract was ultimately renegotiated. Results provide guidance on rent re-distribution and contract renegotiation more generally and are applicable to contemporary policy issues such as climate change legislation

Keywords
Contract Renegotiation; Coal Contracts; Acid Rain; Industrial productivity History; Environmental permits

Journal
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management: Volume 62, Issue 2

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