Preprint / Working Paper
Details
Citation
Schoonbeek L & de Vries F (2008) Environmental Taxes and Industry Monopolization. Stirling Economics Discussion Paper, 2008-19.
Abstract
This paper considers a market with an incumbent monopolistic firm and a potential entrant. Production by both firms causes polluting emissions. The government selects a tax per unit emission by maximizing social welfare. The size of the tax rate affects whether or not the potential entrant enters the market. We identify the conditions that create a market structure where the preferences of the government and the incumbent firm coincide. Interestingly, there are cases where both the government and incumbent firm prefer a monopoly. Hence, the government might induce profitable monopolization by using a socially optimal tax policy instrument.
Keywords
taxes; market structure; environmental pollution; monopoly; Taxation Great Britain Environmental aspects; Environmental impact charges Great Britain; Pollution Economic aspects
JEL codes
- H23: Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- L12: Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
- Q58: Environmental Economics: Government Policy
Title of series | Stirling Economics Discussion Paper |
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Number in series | 2008-19 |
Publication date online | 01/09/2008 |
URL | http://hdl.handle.net/1893/512 |