Simulating a Sequential Coalition Formation Process for the Climate Change Problem: First Come, but Second Served?

Citation

Finus M, Rundshagen B & Eyckmans J (2009) Simulating a Sequential Coalition Formation Process for the Climate Change Problem: First Come, but Second Served?. Stirling Economics Discussion Paper, 2009-08.

Abstract
We analyze stability of self-enforcing climate agreements based on a data set generated by the CLIMNEG world simulation model (CWSM), version 1.2. We consider two new aspects which appear important in actual treaty-making. First, we consider a sequential coalition formation process where players can make proposals which are either accepted or countered by other proposals. Second, we analyze whether a moderator, like an international organization, even without enforcement power, can improve upon globally suboptimal outcomes through coordinating actions by making recommendations that must be Pareto-improving to all parties. We discuss the conceptual difficulties of implementing our algorithm.

Keywords
International Climate Agreements; Sequential Coalition Formation; Coordination through Moderator; Integrated Assessment Model; Algorithm for Computations; Climate changing; Climatic changes International cooperation; Environmental policy International cooperation

JEL codes

• C79: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: Other
• H87: International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods
• Q54: Climate; Natural Disasters and Their Management; Global Warming