Stability and Success of Regional Fisheries Management Organizations

Citation

Pintassilgo P, Finus M, Lindroos M & Munro G (2008) Stability and Success of Regional Fisheries Management Organizations. Stirling Economics Discussion Paper, 2008-11.

Abstract
According to international law, straddling fish stocks should be managed cooperatively through Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs). This paper analyzes the stability and success of these organizations through a game in partition function form based on the classical Gordon-Schaefer bioeconomic model. It is shown that the larger the number of fishing states that compete for the fish stock the higher are the relative gains from full cooperation, but the lower is the likelihood of large RFMOs being stable. Moreover, the success of coalition formation is positively correlated with the degree of production cost asymmetry among fishing states and negatively with the overall level of efficiency.

Keywords
straddling fish stock; regional fisheries management organizations; unregulated fishing; bioeconomic model; coalition formation model; free-riding; Fishery management, International Mathematical models; Fishery law and legislation

JEL codes

• C72: Noncooperative Games
• Q22: Renewable Resources and Conservation: Fishery; Aquaculture