The Enforcement Mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol: Flawed or Promising Concepts?

Citation

Finus M (2008) The Enforcement Mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol: Flawed or Promising Concepts?. Letters in Spatial and Resource Sciences, 1 (1), pp. 13-25. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12076-008-0002-8

Abstract
The Kyoto Protocol is praised by some scholars and criticized by others. This paper evaluates the enforcement mechanisms comprising monitoring and noncompliance procedures based on an informal game theoretic analysis. It is argued that the monitoring system has achieved an unprecedented level of sophistication. It also appears that the non-compliance procedures have achieved a remarkable quality (in particular when judged in view of past international environmental treaties) in terms of their deterrence potential and credibility, though there is room for improvement. Possibilities for improvement are outlined and possible supplemental non-compliance procedures are proposed.

Keywords
Kyoto protocol; Monitoring; Non-compliance procedures; Game theoretic analysis; Game theory; Kyoto Protocol

Journal
Letters in Spatial and Resource Sciences: Volume 1, Issue 1