A coordination-based methodology for security protocol verification

Citation

Bracciali A, Baldi G, Ferrari G & Tuosto E (2005) A coordination-based methodology for security protocol verification. In: volume 121. 2nd International Workshop on Security Issues with Petri Nets and other Computational Models (WISP 2004), Bologna, Italy, 26.06.2004-26.06.2004. Elsevier, pp. 23-46. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.entcs.2004.10.006

Abstract
The quest for the formal certification of properties of systems is one of the most challenging research issues in the field of formal methods. It requires the development of formal models together with effective verification techniques. In this paper, we describe a formal methodology for verifying security protocols based on ideas borrowed from the analysis of open systems, where applications interact with one another by dynamically sharing common resources and services in a not fully trusted environment. The methodology is supported by ASPASyA, a tool based on symbolic model checking techniques.

Keywords
Formal methods; formal certification; security protocols; open systems; symbolic model checking

Journal
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science: Volume 121