Article
Details
Citation
Johnston C (2013) Judgment and the identity theory of truth. Philosophical Studies, 166 (2), pp. 381-397. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-012-0046-x
Abstract
The identity theory of truth takes on different forms depending on whether it is combined with a dual relation or a multiple relation theory of judgment. This paper argues that there are two significant problems for the dual relation identity theorist regarding thought's answerability to reality, neither of which takes a grip on the multiple relation identity theory.
Keywords
Judgment;
Truth;
Multiple relation theory of judgment;
Identity theory of truth
Journal
Philosophical Studies: Volume 166, Issue 2
Status | Published |
---|---|
Funders | Arts and Humanities Research Council |
Publication date | 30/11/2013 |
Publication date online | 31/10/2012 |
URL | http://hdl.handle.net/1893/11406 |
Publisher | Springer |
ISSN | 0554-0739 |
eISSN | 2153-8379 |
People (1)
Senior Lecturer, Philosophy