Fiscal decentralization, central bank independence, and inflation

Citation

King DN & Ma Y (2001) Fiscal decentralization, central bank independence, and inflation. Economics Letters, 72 (1), pp. 95-98. http://www-scopus-com.ezproxy.stir.ac.uk/record/display.url?eid=2-s2.0-0035630849&origin=resultslist&sort=plf-f&src=s&st1=Fiscal+decentralization%2c+central+bank+independence%2c+and+inflation&sid=F378058BA5BB4D379217DCE03CA09A48.y7ESLndDIsN8cE7qwvy6w%3a120; https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-1765%2801%2900405-0

Abstract
We develop earlier cross-sectional studies of inflation rates by adding the degree of tax centralization as another explanatory variable. This makes central bank independence perform appreciably better as an explanatory variable. Also, we find that centralized countries have higher inflation.

Keywords
Decentralization; Inflation; Central bank independence

Journal
Economics Letters: Volume 72, Issue 1