Why it is Disrespectful to Violate Rights: Contractualism and the Kind-Desire Theory

Citation

Schaab JD (2018) Why it is Disrespectful to Violate Rights: Contractualism and the Kind-Desire Theory. Philosophical Studies, 175 (1), pp. 97-116. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-017-0857-x

Abstract
The most prominent theories of rights, the Will Theory and the Interest Theory, notoriously fail to accommodate all and only rights-attributions that make sense to ordinary speakers. The Kind-Desire Theory, Leif Wenar’s recent contribution to the field, appears to fare better in this respect than any of its predecessors. The theory states that we attribute a right to an individual if she has a kind-based desire that a certain enforceable duty be fulfilled. A kind-based desire is a reason to want something which one has simply in virtue of being a member of a certain kind. Rowan Cruft objects that this theory creates a puzzle about the relation between rights and respect. In particular, if rights are not grounded in aspects of the particular individuals whose rights they are (e.g., their well-being), how can we sustain the intuitive notion that to violate a right is to disrespect the right-holder? I present a contractualist account of respect which reconciles the Kind-Desire Theory with the intuition that rights-violations are disrespectful. On this account, respect for a person is a matter of acknowledging her legitimate authority to make demands on the will and conduct of others. And I argue that kind-based desires authorize a person to make demands even if they do not correspond to that person’s well-being or other non-relational features.

Keywords
Contractualism; Rights; Kind-Desire Theory; Respect; Dignity; Second-person standpoint

Journal
Philosophical Studies: Volume 175, Issue 1

• Schaab_PhilosStud_2018.pdf