Eliminating episodic memory?

Citation

Andonovski N, Sutton J & McCarroll CJ (2024) Eliminating episodic memory?. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 379 (1913). https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2023.0413

Abstract
In Tulving’s initial characterization, episodic memory was one of multiple memory systems. It was postulated, in pursuit of explanatory depth, as displaying proprietary operations, representations and substrates such as to explain a range of cognitive, behavioural and experiential phenomena. Yet the subsequent development of this research programme has, paradoxically, introduced surprising doubts about the nature, and indeed existence, of episodic memory. On dominant versions of the ‘common system’ view, on which a single simulation system underlies both remembering and imagining, there are no processes unique to memory to support robust generalizations with inductive potential. Eliminativism about episodic memory seems to follow from the claim that it has no dedicated neurocognitive system of its own. After identifying this undernoticed threat, we push back against modern eliminativists by surveying recent evidence that still indicates specialized mechanisms, computations and representations that are distinctly mnemic in character. We argue that contemporary realists about episodic memory can retain lessons of the common system approach while resisting the further move to eliminativism. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research’.

Keywords
episodic memory; memory systems; eliminativism

Journal
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences: Volume 379, Issue 1913

• Eliminating Episodic Memory?