Conceivability: Still Not Enough.

Citation

Roca Royes S (2023) Conceivability: Still Not Enough. [A response to Prelević]. In: Vaidya A & Prelević D (eds.) Epistemology of Modality and Philosophical Methodology. 1 ed. Routledge Studies in Epistemology. New York: Routledge, pp. 218-230. https://www.routledge.com/Epistemology-of-Modality-and-Philosophical-Methodology/Vaidya-Prelevic/p/book/9780367431679

Abstract
First Paragraph Prelević’s paper (this volume) is a thorough piece which presses me to clarify the argument in my 2011 paper ‘Conceivability and de re modal knowledge’. That paper deals with different types of conceivability-based epistemologies one finds in the literature, and constructs a dilemma for them (Roca-Royes 2011, §6), placing epistemic accounts on one horn and non-epistemic accounts on the other. The scope of this response however will be narrower, to match that of Prelević’s paper.