That which ‘is true’ must already contain the verb: Wittgenstein’s rejection of Frege’s separation of judgment from content

Citation

Johnston C (2023) That which ‘is true’ must already contain the verb: Wittgenstein’s rejection of Frege’s separation of judgment from content. In: Zalabarado JL (ed.) Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus: A Critical Guide. Cambridge Critical Guides. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (CUP). https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/wittgensteins-tractatus-logicophilosophicus/D98F7DEEF0B576D6FC33FAA949C8B241

Abstract
Truth and content are theoretically prior in Frege to the act of judgment. Wittgenstein takes the opposite view, maintaining that truth is fundamentally correctness in judgment and that a content is fundamentally something to be judged. At Tractatus 4.063, Wittgenstein gives an argument against the Fregean position. Judgment can aim internally at truth, Wittgenstein holds, only if it is internal to truth that it is correctness in judgment.