Article
Details
Citation
Johnston C (2024) Wittgenstein and Frege on Negation and Denial. Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy, 12 (3). https://jhaponline.org/jhap/article/view/5476
Abstract
Frege maintains that there are not two distinct acts, assertion and denial; rather, denying p is one and the same as asserting not-p. Wittgenstein appears not to recognise this identity in Frege, attributing to him the contrary view that a proposition may have one of two verbs, ‘is true’ or ‘is false’. This paper explains Wittgenstein’s attribution as a consequence of Frege’s treatment of content as theoretically prior to the act of judgment. Where content is prior to judgment, the denial of p – what is rejected in asserting p – is distinct from the assertion of not-p. Wittgenstein’s own embrace of Frege’s identity is then considered, an embrace explained in part by his repudiation of Frege’s theoretical order.
Journal
Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy: Volume 12, Issue 3
Status | Published |
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Publication date | 31/12/2024 |
Publication date online | 08/04/2024 |
Date accepted by journal | 21/09/2023 |
URL | http://hdl.handle.net/1893/35921 |
Publisher URL | https://jhaponline.org/jhap/article/view/5476 |
eISSN | 2159-0303 |
People (1)
Senior Lecturer, Philosophy