Book Chapter
Hurtig K (2020) Consent and Normativity. In: Garcia-Godinez M, Mellin R & Tuomela R (eds.) Social Ontology, Normativity and Law. Berlin: De Gruyter. https://www.degruyter.com/view/title/566327; https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110663617-007
I joined the philosophy department at Stirling in September 2005 after having briefly taught at Oxford University and the University of Otago in New Zealand. I am not new to Scotland, however, as I did my MLitt and PhD at the University of St Andrews. Between 2009 and 2012 I was a Research Fellow at the Uppsala University in Sweden. Teaching Spring 2021 PHIU9J4 Moral Theory
My interests in philosophy are very broad. Although I am first and foremost a moral philosopher (broadly construed), I am also interested in epistemology, philosophy of action, and philosophy mind. More specifically, I am interested in the normative aspects of these subjects. I am currently working on various topics within the theories of practical reason and rationality.
A Scottish Network for Normative Philosophy
PI: Dr Kent Hurtig
Funded by: The Carnegie Trust
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The Foundations and Scope of External Reasons for Action and Intention
PI: Dr Kent Hurtig
Funded by: Arts and Humanities Research Council
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Book Chapter
Hurtig K (2020) Consent and Normativity. In: Garcia-Godinez M, Mellin R & Tuomela R (eds.) Social Ontology, Normativity and Law. Berlin: De Gruyter. https://www.degruyter.com/view/title/566327; https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110663617-007
Addendum
Correction to: The fitting attitudes analysis of value: an explanatory challenge
Hurtig K (2019) Correction to: The fitting attitudes analysis of value: an explanatory challenge. Philosophical Studies, 176 (12), pp. 3251-3252. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1188-2
Article
The fitting attitudes analysis of value: an explanatory challenge
Hurtig K (2019) The fitting attitudes analysis of value: an explanatory challenge. Philosophical Studies, 176 (12), pp. 3241-3249. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1172-x
Book Chapter
Why Internalists about Reasons should be Humeans about Motivation
Hurtig K (2009) Why Internalists about Reasons should be Humeans about Motivation. In: Hume on Motivation and Virtue. Philosophers in Depth. Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 179-185. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230281158_9
Article
On prima facie obligations and nonmonotonicity
Hurtig K (2007) On prima facie obligations and nonmonotonicity. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 36 (5), pp. 599-604. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-007-9056-0
Article
Hurtig KI (2006) Internalism and Accidie. Philosophical Studies, 129 (3), pp. 517-543. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-2904-7